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Recent Developments in Judicial Review
of Immigration Cases*
CHARLES GORDON**
In his Article, Professor Gordon discusses the viability of
judicial review in immigration decisions. He first discusses
the history of judicial review in immigration cases and specif-
ically addresses several considerations which have motivated
courts in their review of immigration determinations. The
author then considers several aspects of judicial review, in-
cluding due process considerations, the judicial review of con-
sular decisions, the Fleuti principle, and the limitations on
immigration officers' authority. Professor Gordon concludes
with a discussion of the humanitarian concerns and constitu-
tional issues involved in immigration cases.
INTRODUCTION
The respect for individual rights is a hallmark of our society,
demanded by our traditions and proclaimed in our Constitution. This
concept is a protective shield for each of us, and it is particularly
significant in our dealings with resident aliens. Although there have
been notable lapses in the past, it can reasonably be said that the
alien in the United States has generally been assured fair treatment.
* This Article is based on, and expands, a speech given by the author at a
symposium of the Los Angeles Bar Association on April 30, 1977.
** Practicing attorney, Washington, D.C.; formerly General Counsel, Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service. Coauthor of C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE (1954). Adjunct Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center and University of San Diego Law School.
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The courts have been the chief agency in providing such assurance.
They are the ultimate refuge for the individual confronted by the
mighty forces of government. In discharging their constitutional
functions, courts are constantly asked to curb the illegal, excessive,
or arbitrary. actions of government officials. Moreover, the courts
have often been responsive to the pleas of aliens in the United States
who contend that they have been dealt with unjustly.
It is true, of course, that the right to judicial review of immigration
determinations has not always been a settled concept.' After general
immigration controls were imposed by the federal government in
1882,2 early decisions expressed a limited view of the judicial func-
tion, declaring that Congress had empowered the administrators to
act "without judicial intervention."13 However, this view was soon
modified, for the courts responded to the pleas of litigants who
invoked the due process mandate of the fifth amendment. Developing
due process concerns led to a constant expansion of the opportunities
for judicial review.'
There were significant setbacks in this process of development,
usually reflecting popular attitudes during times of crisis or concern.
Thus, the courts sanctioned extreme measures against the Chinese,
even when rights of citizenship' or established residence6 were in-
volved. Additionally, judicial approval was often forthcoming for
punitive measures against radicals.' Severe wartime restrictions
were also approved for resident aliens of enemy nationality, so-
called enemy aliens.' Finally, in the most shocking departure from
their protective role, and influenced by wartime conditions, the
courts tolerated curfew restrictions for people of Japanese ancestry,
their removal from their homes, and their internment-regardless of
whether they were citizens or aliens. 9
Although one must deplore the failures in these situations, it is fair
to note that in some respects the courts ultimately ameliorated the
1. See Gordon, The Alien and the Constitution, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (1972).
2. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
3. Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 305 (1902).
4. See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 7-8
(rev. ed. 1959).
5. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1904).
6. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1892); The Chinese Exclu-
sion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
7. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206(1953); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524 (1952).
8. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
9. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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severity of their edicts. Thus, both Chinese'0 and radicals" in the
United States were accorded more stringent safeguards. West coast
citizens of Japanese ancestry could not be interned without a specific
finding of disloyalty.'2 Even alien enemies were accorded a limited-
albeit inadequate-measure of procedural protection, consisting of
an inquiry into whether the affected person was a national of an
enemy country and whether the action against him was taken during
a time of declared war or threatened invasion.13
Despite these setbacks, the impact of judicial review in immigra-
tion cases has, in the long run, constantly increased. An important
milestone was the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in
1946,14 under which the courts authorized expanded judicial re-
view.'5 Although Congress sought to limit this remedy in 1961,16 this
effort ultimately was defeated." The result has been a marked ex-
pansion in the opportunities for judicial review.
As one who has been deeply involved in litigation for many years, I
have always been fascinated by the developing panorama of judicial
review. Of course, my own point of view has varied with the different
directions of my approach to the courts-as a government official, a
teacher, an author, and now as a private lawyer. The actors on the
judicial stage have also changed. The Warren Court, which was
10. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922) (resident alien threatened with
deportation entitled to de novo judicial determination on unfrivolous citizenship
claim); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (children born to
Chinese aliens in the United States entitled to citizenship benefits); Wong Wing
v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (punishment cannot be imposed without
safeguards afforded in criminal prosecution); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886) (right to earn livelihood protected).
11. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (deportability must be proven by clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence); Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374
U.S. 469 (1963) (government must prove meaningful membership in Communist
Party); Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957) (only meaningful member of
Communist Party deportable).
12. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
13. Jaegeler v. Carusi, 342 U.S. 347 (1952); Zeller v. Watkins, 167 F.2d 279 (2d
Cir. 1948); Gregoire v. Watkins, 164 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1947); Schwarzkopf v. Uhl,
137 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1943); Zdunic v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1943).
14. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970).
15: Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956) (exclusion orders);
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955) (deportation orders).
16. Immigration & Nationality Act § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1970) [the
Immigration and Nationality Act is hereinafter cited as I. & N. Act].
17. See Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968); 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 8-126 (rev. ed. 1959).
generally liberal in its attitude to issues affecting aliens and citizen-
ship, has been succeeded by the Burger Court, which is generally
disposed to be more conservative on such issues. The result is that the
lower courts are sometimes more active than the Supreme Court in
seeking to explore new judicial trails.
Judicial review has produced a period of remarkable change. We
have witnessed the death of many old concepts and the birth of new
ones. Although some venerable precepts still persist, they are con-
stantly being challenged. And it is not unreasonable to expect that
this process of reevaluation will continue.
Exposure to the judicial process has enabled me to identify a
number of major considerations which have motivated the courts in
their review of immigration determinations. In recent years they
have included 1) the imposition of limitations on the authority of
government officers in order to reduce the opportunities for oppres-
sive action; 2) the continuing expansion in the horizons of due proc-
ess and increasing participation of the courts in the administrative
process in order to promote greater fairness; 3) the reaction to
humanitarian concerns, to profound hardships, and to the imposition
of major penalties for minimal infractions; 4) the enlargement of the
economic protections of resident aliens against restrictive actions by
the states; 5) the willingness to confront constitutional challenges to
deportation statutes (although no court has rejected the ancient
Holmes-Frankfurter thesis of plenary and unreviewable Congres-
sional power, an optimistic soul may possibly detect the beginning of
a process of erosion); and 6) vigilance in safeguarding citizenship
rights and status.
Like all generalizations, those previously enumerated are not in-
fallibly true. But they may be helpful in assessing some of the recent
judicial and administrative expressions which I have attempted to
categorize.
LIMITATIONS ON THE AUTHORITY OF IMMIGRATION OFFICERS
Until quite recently it was assumed that immigration officers had
virtually untrammeled authority to stop and search automobiles, 8 to
question persons suspected to be aliens, and to round up and detain
such persons while the inquiry continued. That assumption was sup-
ported by an expansive statutory grant of authority 9 and by numer-
18. See Bernsen, Search and Seizure on the Highway forImmigration Viola-
tions: A Survey of the Law, 13 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 69 (1975).
19. I. & N. Act § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1970).
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ous decisions of the lower federal courts.20 But it was shattered by the
Supreme Court in a notable series of cases-commencing with Al-
meida-Sanchez v. United States,"' and continuing with United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce"l and United States v. Ortiz 23 -which have
applied and enforced the strictures of the fourth amendment. The
following principles emerged from those decisions:
1. Although immigration officers are empowered to stop, detain,
and search vehicles at the border, random searches and detentions of
such vehicles and their occupants which occur away from the border
or its functional equivalent 4 are prohibited unless they are based on
consent, probable cause, or supported by a search warrant. Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Almeida-Sanchez25 suggested the
possibility of an area search warrant. Even though such warrants
have sometimes been utilized by the administrative authorities, their
validity has been questioned by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte ,26 a deci-
sion subsequently reversed on other grounds.7
2. In Ortiz, the Supreme Court held that searches of automobiles
at Service checkpoints were barred absent consent or probable cause.
However, the Court's later decision in Martinez-Fuerte permitted
immigration officers to stop automobiles and question their occu-
pants at Service checkpoints within a reasonable distance from the
border.
3. In Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court prohibited random
stops and interrogations by immigration officers unless they are
based on a reasonable suspicion-founded on specific, articulable
facts together with rational inferences from those facts-that the
questioned person is an alien. The Court declared that a person's race
or ancestry was not in and of itself a reasonable basis for interrogat-
ing him, but it might be taken into account as a relevant factor.
Thereafter, the Seventh Circuit, in addressing a question left unan-
20. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 5-13
(rev. ed. 1959).
21. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
22. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
23. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
24. See United States v. Hart, 525 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1976).
25. 413 U.S. 266, 275 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
26. 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975).
27. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
swered in Brignoni-Ponce, ruled that the officers had no authority to
stop and question any person unless they had a reasonable basis for
suspecting that the interrogated person was an alien illegally in the
United States. 28 Yet, in a subsequent en banc decision issued by a
divided court, the Seventh Circuit reversed itself and ruled that
immigration officers could interrogate persons reasonably suspected
to be aliens without the need for reasonable suspicion that the ques-
tioned person is illegally in the United States.2 9
These decisions have manifestly set limits on official enforcement
activities. Recognizing such limits, the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service has issued a directive forbidding random interrogations
by its officers, except when there are specific complaints against
employed aliens at their places of employment or on the basis of
reasonable grounds for believing the suspected person is an alien.3
However, there is often a wide gap between the official policies and
the actual practices of enforcement officers. What can a lawyer do to
challenge such practices?
One device is the class action, invoked with conspicuous success in
Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod.3 1 Obviously, this is not a feasible
alternative for the practitioner representing clients with limited re-
sources. Another approach is a suit against the officers, or against the
United States, for damages resulting from their illegal actions. Al-
though such suits are sanctioned by court decisions 2 and by stat-
ute,3 I am aware of no such action against immigration officers
which has been pressed to a successful conclusion. Again, however,
this may not be an effective alternative for the lawyer representing
individual clients in deportation cases. Moreover, the practitioner
may be concerned with the fact that if he brought such suits, he
would incur the hostility of officers with whom he must deal on a
day-to-day basis.
The final device, and the one most frequently invoked by immigra-
tion lawyers, is to challenge evidence obtained by improper means.
Although there have been some recent rumblings in the Supreme
Court regarding the retention of the exclusionary rule,3 4 I have no
28. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976).
29. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977). It
should be noted that there was no petition for certiorari from this decision.
30. Department of Justice, Press Release (Dec. 3, 1976) (with attached direc-
tive to Service field offices).
31. 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977).
32. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970).
34. See generally Gilligan, Continuing Evisceration of [the] Fourth Amend-
ment, 14 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 823 (1977).
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doubt that a deportation order based on such tainted evidence would
currently be rejected as the fruit of the poisonous tree.35 Yet chal-
lenges to deportation orders on this ground are rarely successful
because the government invariably attempts to rely on untainted
evidence. Its proof usually consists of identifying the respondent,
relying on its official records relating to him and inferences arising
from his silence,36 the identity of names,37 and the statutory require-
ment that the respondent show the time, place, and means of his
entry.38 Practitioners counter this approach by advising the respond-
ent to remain completely silent-even to the point of instructing the
respondent to refuse to identify himself. This tactic may conceivably
be successful, particularly when the respondent has entered without
inspection and there are no official records relating to him.
DUE PROCESS AND THE ASSURANCE OF FAim PLAY
The following group of decisions touch upon considerations of due
process. In studying these decisions, one sometimes has the feeling he
is witnessing the emergence of heroic new concepts struggling to be
born.
Right to Counsel
The right to be represented by counsel is an acknowledged aspect
of due process39 and is recognized in the immigration statute.40 But
the statute specifies that such representation must be obtained by the
alien "at no expense to the government."'" What of the indigent who
cannot afford to pay for his own lawyer? A number of litigants have
contended that, in light of the grave consequences of a deportation
case, an indigent respondent has a constitutional right to be repre-
sented by an assigned counsel who is compensated by the govern-
ment. In successfully opposing such contentions, the government has
relied on the dogma that deportation proceedings, however severe
their consequences, are civil and not criminal and thus the sixth
35. Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1960).
36. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103 (1927); Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263
U.S. 149 (1923).
37. Chung Young Chew v. Boyd, 309 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1962); Vlisidis v.
Holland, 245 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1957).
38. I. & N. Act § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
39. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1962).
40. I. & N. Act §§ 242(b), 292, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b), 1362 (1970).
41. Id. § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362.
amendment is inapplicable.42 Some courts have summarily rejected
the effort to invoke a right to assigned counsel;43 others have de-
scribed the issue as "momentous" but have avoided resolving it on
the ground that counsel could not have changed the result in the
cases before them.44 One court recently declared that although there
would be a right to assigned counsel if such assignment were neces-
sary to achieve fundamental fairness, the failure to provide counsel
had produced no unfairness in the case before the court.45
Thus far no court has upheld a right to assigned counsel in depor-
tation cases. At the same time the courts have emphasized the need
for fundamental fairness, and doubtless would make an appropriate
response if persuaded that the lack of counsel has resulted in preju-
dice to the respondent. In such situations the court could vacate the
deportation order against the unrepresented respondent. The court
might also direct that the case be remanded with directions that the
government provide assigned counsel for the respondent.
A related issue concerns the situation of a respondent who was
represented by counsel but claims that the representation was not
effective because counsel botched his defense. One court recently
indicated that a lack of effective representation might be offensive to
due process, but found that there had been no such lack in the case
before it.46
Judicial Review of Consular Decisions
The critical importance of the American consul's function, and the
widespread belief that consular determinations are sometimes arbi-
trary or unlawful,4 7 has led to repeated efforts to invoke judicial
review. These efforts, however, have almost invariably been blocked
by the traditional view that a consul's determination rejecting a visa
42. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 20, at 1-87.
43. United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1975); Dunn-Marin v.
INS, 426 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1970).
44. Rosales-Caballero v. INS, 472 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1973); Henriques v. INS,
465 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1972).
45. Aguilera-Enriques v. INS, 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975).
46. Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975).
47. The University of San Diego School of Law, under a grant from the
National Science Foundation, is presently conducting an exhaustive study of
the exercise of discretion by consular officers in the issuance of visas under the
current immigration laws. The project will study variations in rejection rates for
visa applications. These variations will then be correlated with possible causal
factors such as the officer's workload, background, and country in which he is
working. Through interviews and questionnaires, the study will attempt to de-
fine and compare the influence of specific factors in applying "public charge"
and "valid marriage" criteria. Conclusions and recommendations will be pub-
lished in volume 16 of the San Diego Law Review.
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application is not subject to judicial review. In one recent case, a
litigant unsuccessfully sought such a review on the basis of a claim
that the consul had failed to follow State Department regulations.48
Similarly rejected were claims that judicial review was warranted
because the denial was predicated on an issue of law-for example,
the validity of a marriage. 49 However, the Supreme Court has sug-
gested that judicial review of visa refusals might be warranted when
constitutional rights of American citizens are implicated.50 Another
court has found that the consul's determinations which do not relate
to the refusal of a visa-for example, the denial of a visa petition on
behalf of a relative-are subject to challenge in the courts.5
I have always believed that the absolute power conferred upon a
consul is unjustifiable and that his decisions should be amenable to
appropriate administrative and judicial review. My own view is that
this is a concept which ultimately must prevail."
Estoppel
The possibility of estoppel against the government has a fascina-
tion for lawyers. The once-accepted axiom that the government can
never be estopped by the acts or omissions of its officers has lost
credibility over the years, and there are frequent efforts to invoke
estoppel. The Ninth Circuit has been quite receptive to such pleas. In
one case, that court found the government estopped to deport aliens
who were improperly admitted by the immigration officers. 3 But the
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reconsidered its decision and rejected
the estoppel claim, relying instead on the Supreme Court's resolution
in INS v. Hibi. 1
4
Hibi involved World War II Filipino veterans who contended that
they had been improperly denied the opportunity to apply for special
naturalization benefits. The court summarily concluded that there
could be no estoppel against the government unless there was af-
firmative misconduct by its officers. Thereafter, many litigants have
48. Burrafato v. United States Dep't of State, 523 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1975).
49. Rivera de Gomez v. Kissinger, 534 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1976).
50. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
51. Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Fiallo v.
Bell, 97 S. Ct. 1473 (1977).
52. See Gordon, The Need to Modernize Our Immigration Laws, 13 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1, 9 (1975); Rosenfield, Consular Non-Reviewability: A Case
Study in Administrative Absolutism, 41 A.B.A.J. 1109 (1955).
53. Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1975).
54. Id. See also INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973).
attempted to establish such affirmative misconduct in various con-
texts. One such attempt was persuasive to a United States District
Court in a recent decision,5 5 now on appeal, supporting naturaliza-
tion applications by aliens in a situation similar to that of the unsuc-
cessful Filipino veterans in Hibi. Other courts have estopped the
government when an applicant was disadvantaged by failure of an
American consul to follow State Department regulations" and by
inexcusable delay by the Service in acting on an application.
7 It
would appear that the prospects for prevailing on an estoppel claim
are far from hopeless.
Fleuti Principle
Issues generated by the Supreme Court's decision fourteen years
ago in Rosenberg v. Fleuti,5 8 relating to the effect of a brief absence
from the United States, still provoke controversy. Fleuti was a land-
mark in the Warren Court's generous approach to issues involving
the rights of aliens. The Court's venerable precedents had charac-
terized every return to the United States following a temporary
absence as a new entry, subjecting a resident alien to possible exclu-
sion and deportation.59 This so-called reentry doctrine had provoked
widespread criticism60 and had been ameliorated by lower court
decisions6' and by a Supreme Court holding62 which found that there
could be no new entry under the immigration laws if the absence was
involuntary.
With characteristic severity, the sponsors of the McCarran-Walter
Act sought to halt the development of a more rational principle by
defining entry as "any coming of an alien into the United States
. . . .whether voluntarily or otherwise," unless he could establish
that his departure or his presence in a foreign state was not volun-
tary.6" However, this legislative effort to codify an unsound premise
did not deter the Warren Court from seeking to forge a more rea-
sonable principle. In Fleuti, the Court held that an alien who had
55. In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D.
Cal. 1975).
56. Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976).
57. Sun II Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976).
58. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
59. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
60. PRESIDENTIAL COMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE
SHALL WELCOME 179 (1953) (report); 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note
20, at 4-37; Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56
COLUM. L. R.v. 309, 327 (1956).
61. De Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947); Valenti v. Karmuth, 1
F. Supp. 370 (N.D.N.Y. 1932).
62. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947) (shipwrecked sailor taken to
foreign port by rescue ship).
63. I. & N. Act § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1970).
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made a brief visit of a few hours to Mexico did not upon his return
make an entry which made him subject to deportation. The Court
found that the statutory definition of entry did not apply to a trip
which was "innocent, casual, and brief." The Court suggested that a
new entry by a resident alien could occur only if there was "an intent
to depart in a manner which can be regarded as meaningfully inter-
ruptive of the alien's permanent residence.""
Fleuti obviously was intended to alert the lower courts and the
administrators to the need for a more rational attitude. To some
extent, this effort has probably succeeded. Yet the circumstances
under which there will be a "meaningful interruption of residence"
are not yet fully defined.65 Among the factors which Fleuti suggested
for consideration are the length of the absence, whether its purpose
was opposed to a policy reflected in the immigration laws, and
whether travel documents had to be procured for the trip. An addi-
tional factor suggested by another court is the uprooting caused by
deportation-for example, length of residence in the United States,
family ties, property or employment interests in the United States,
the nature of the environment to which the alien would be deported,
and his relationship to that environment.66
The precise limits of the Fleuti principle are still being debated.
Thus, one court has found that an alien who became involved in
illegal smuggling activity during a brief absence in Mexico did not
make an entry upon his return.67 The Ninth Circuit opposed this
view, finding that the illegal activity obliterated the innocent charac-
ter of the absence, whether the unlawful purpose was formed before
or after the alien's departure.6 Another court agreed, but a dissent-
ing judge exclaimed that he was "dismayed" by such "mechanical
and inhumane application of our immigration laws" which impose
deportability on the basis of a one-hour lunch trip across the bor-
der.69 Still another court suggested possible doubt as to whether a
resident alien forfeited his residence status by entering without
inspection. 0
64. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963).
65. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 20, at 4-37.
66. Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 1974).
67. Vargas-Banuelos v. INS, 466 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972).
68. Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1974).
69. Longoria-Castaneda v. INS, 548 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1977).
70. Ferraro v. INS, 535 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1976).
The Ninth Circuit, in a more generous mood, found that a resident
alien who made a brief, casual trip across the border could not be
deprived of his right to deportation proceedings."' The Board of
Immigration Appeals has now adopted that view. 2
Applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act
Another dormant issue recently revived and rejected by the Third
Circuit was a challenge to a deportation order on the grbund that two
members of the Board of Immigration Appeals had previously served
on my staff in the INS General Counsel's office." A surprisingly
vehement dissent urged that although the Supreme Court had found
the Administrative Procedure Act inapplicable to hearings before
immigration judges, 4 the Act nevertheless applied to the appellate
process before the Board. Although the same issue has subsequently
arisen in other cases, no other judge has shared the dissenting judge's
vehemence or point of view.
Denial of Discretionary Relief When Eligibility Assumed
The Third Circuit recently favored another novel contention by
holding that before denying an application in the exercise of discre-
tion, it was necessary to rule specifically on the applicant's eligi-
bility.76 The Supreme Court, evidently unimpressed by this holding,
reversed it summarily without hearing argument and endorsed the
practice of assuming eligibility when denying an application in the
exercise of discretion.77
Denials of Labor Certifications
Litigants who challenge the denial of labor certifications have
experienced almost uniform success,78 except perhaps in the District
of Columbia.79 Yet for years the Labor Department remained imper-
vious to repeated criticisms of its procedures. A recent revision of the
71. Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1975).
72. In re Rangel, I.D. No. 2524 (BIA 1976).
73. Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1976).
74. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
75. See Ho Chong Tsao v. INS, 538 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1976); Cisternas-Estay v.
INS, 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976).
76. Bagamasbad v. INS, 531 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1976).
77. INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976). See also Vissian v. INS, 548 F.2d
325 (10th Cir. 1977).
78. Silva v. Secretary of Labor, 518 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1975); Yong v. United
States Dep't of Labor, 509 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1975); Reddy, Inc. v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 492 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1974); Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 490
F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1973).
79. Acupuncture Center of Washington v. Dunlop, 543 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1038 (1974).
[VOL. 15: 9, 1977] Judicial Review of Immigration Cases
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
regulations80 did improve the opportunities for administrative re-
view.81 However, the new regulations also inaugurated excessively
burdensome preliminary requirements82 whose only purpose seems
to be to obstruct the completion of the application. It is still too early
to determine how those regulations will affect the attitude of the
courts.
Mandates for Specific Administrative Procedures
Three recent court cases, all of which were class actions sponsored
by public interest groups, have mandated remarkably detailed ad-
ministrative procedures. The first case is the previously discussed
Illinois Migrant Council decision," in which the court's decree
spelled out in detail the practices permitted and those proscribed in
interrogations and detentions.
An even more pervasive catalogue appears in the decree, entered
with the government's consent, by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York in Stokes v. United States.84
The lawsuit questioned the administrative practices of conducting
interviews in visa petition cases involving the spouses of American
citizens. The consent decree agreed to comprehensive procedural
improvements, including provisions for recorded interviews, in-
creased participation by counsel, enhanced fairness, and the elimina-
tion of unreasonable, demeaning, and oppressive practices. Although
there can be no reasonable justification for failing to extend the same
procedures throughout the United States, the Service thus far has not
done so.
The final instance is the temporary restraining order of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Silva v.
Levi.85 This decision precludes efforts to deport Western Hemisphere
aliens registered on consular waiting lists before January 1, 1977.
The decree sets forth the form of notice that must be given to each
such alien and requires that he also be given a statement authorizing
his employment while he waits for his visa number to be allocated.
80. Labor Certification Process for Permanent Employment of Aliens in the
United States, 20 C.F.R. § 656 (1977).
81. Id. §§ 656.25-656.26.
82. Id. § 656.21.
83. See notes 28 & 29 supra.
84. No. 74-1022 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 11, 1976).
85. No. 76-4268 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 1977).
HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS
The promotion of family unity, the alleviation of excessive hard-
ships, and other humanitarian concerns patently influence the courts
in many cases. A number of examples will be given.
Errico and Its Progeny
A good starting point is the Supreme Court's 1966 decision in INS
v. Errico, 86 which ruled that section 241(f) of the statute87 authorized
waiver of quota restrictions for aliens with close family ties who had
made misrepresentations in entering the United States. This gener-
ous reading of the statute, impelled by a desire to promote family
unity, led to much litigation and an effort by some courts to enlarge
the ambit of the waiver. 88
The Supreme Court in Reid v. INS 89 attempted to halt these appar-
ent distortions of the statute and declared that the statutory waiver
was limited to excludability for the misrepresentation itself and did
not apply when there was an independent ground for de-
portability-for example, entry without inspection or overstay of
temporary entry. The Board of Immigration Appeals subsequently
attempted to nail down the coffin of Errico by holding that the
section 241(f) waiver did not apply when the deportation order was
based on a charge of entry without a proper immigrant visa.9"
However, it seems that old concepts do not readily die or fade
away, and conflicts have developed. Some courts have followed the
Board and severely limited the applicability of the section 241(f)
waiver.91 Other courts have rejected this narrow interpretation and
have concluded that waiver of the fraud also nullifies a charge of
entry without a proper immigrant visa.9 2 It seems clear that the battle
lines are forming for another joust in the Supreme Court.
Waiver of Deportability for Longtime Residents
A desire to promote family unity has also caused an astonishing
leap forward in decisions interpreting section 212(c) of the statute. 3
This is a limited codification of the earlier Seventh Proviso of the
86. 385 U.S. 214 (1966).
87. I. & N. Act § 241(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1970).
88. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 20, at 4-49.
89. 420 U.S. 619 (1975).
90. In re Montemayor, I.D. No. 2399 (BIA 1975).
91. DeLeon v. INS, 547 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1976); Escobar-Ordonez v. INS, 526
F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1976); Guel-Perales v. INS, 519 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1975).
92. Cacho v. INS, 547 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1976); Persaud v. INS, 537 F.2d 776
(3d Cir. 1976).
93. I. & N. Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1970).
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1917 Act94 and authorizes waiver of excludability for a lawful resi-
dent returning to an unrelinquished domicile of seven years. In its
notable Francis v. INS decision,9" the Second Circuit found it con-
stitutionally impermissible to refuse the same benefit to lawful resi-
dents who had never left the United States and held that such resi-
dent aliens are eligible for a waiver of deportabiity under section
212(c). The Board of Immigration Appeals has since adopted that
interpretation.96 Moreover, in a later holding the Second Circuit
overruled a long-standing administrative interpretation and found
that the seven-year residence period prescribed by the statute did not
have to follow the alien's lawful admission for permanent resi-
dence. 7 These interpretations in effect have opened up a new avenue
of relief from deportation for longtime residents of the United States.
Narcotics Violations
The immigration laws impose extreme penalties on narcotics
violators." The severe and unyielding nature of such penalties, their
irrational imposition of deportation for minor violations such as the
possession of marijuana, and the absence of any significant provision
for amelioration, have sometimes induced the courts to reach for
more reasonable solutions.
One example of this attitude is the Francis case.9 Another exam-
ple relates to statutory provisions for expungement of convictions for
minor drug offenses. A number of courts, following the lead of the
Attorney General,'00 have ruled that such expungement of narcotics
convictions' does not erase deportability.12 However, another court
recently went the other way and questioned the soundness of the
decisions which refused to recognize the effect of the expunge-
ment.103 Moreover, the courts and administrative authorities now
94. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, Proviso 7, 39 Stat. 874 (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1970)).
95. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
96. In re Silva, I.D. No. 2532 (BIA 1976).
97. Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977).
98. I. & N. Act § 241(a)(11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970).
99. See text accompanying note 95 supra for a discussion of this decision.
100. In re A.F., 8 I. & N. Dec. 429 (1959).
101. Cf. In re Ibarra-Obando, 12 1. & N. Dec. 576 (1967) (expungement of other
convictions may erase deportability).
102. Kolios v. INS, 532 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1976); Gonzalez de Lara v. United
States, 439 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1971); Garcia-Gonzales v. INS, 344 F.2d 804 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965).
103. Rehman v. INS, 544 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1976).
hold that deportability is not incurred if the expungement is accom-
plished under a federal or state law designed to deal with juvenile
offenders. 4 Also of interest is the widely-publicized Lennon v. INS
case,0 5 which held that conviction for possession of marijuana would
result in deportation only if the conviction were under a statute
penalizing possession with guilty knowledge.
Judicial Admonitions
Many courts and jurists have deplored the excessive severity of the
deportation laws-in particular, Chief Judge Irving Kaufman of the
Second Circuit, who seems to have embarked on a campaign to
expose the inadequacies and correct the inequities of the immigra-
tion law.' 6 Some courts have sought to provide relief through liberal
interpretations.'0 7 Others have declared that they are powerless to
deviate from the harsh statutory mandates. 0 8 In some instances the
courts have suggested an effort by the administrative authorities to
avert deportation (usually through the deferred action device) in
cases involving humanitarian concerns. 0 9 Of particular interest is
the recent action of the Eighth Circuit in two cases upholding depor-
tation orders but staying the court's mandate to enable the Service to
consider discretionary action to permit the alien to remain in the
United States."0 It can reasonably be anticipated that such judicial
suggestions will be honored.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Litigants keep launching constitutional assaults on various aspects
of the statute, usually without success. However, the efforts continue
and are occasionally productive.
A leading example, of course, is the Francis case, where the court
upheld an equal protection challenge favoring the extension of dis-
cretionary benefits to a previously excluded class of aliens. 111 In
another case, a district court upheld a constitutional challenge to the
deportation of the alien parents of a citizen child, characterizing it as
104. Mestre Morera v. INS, 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972) (Federal Youth Cor-
rections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5021(a) (1970)); In re Lima, I.D. No. 2490 (BIA 1976) (state
expungement); In re Andrade, 14 1. & N. Dec. 651 (1974) (state expungement),
See also In re Zingis, 14 I. & N. Dec. 621 (1974).
105. 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975).
106. Id. See also Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d
.268 (2d Cir. 1976).
107. See cases cited note 106 supra.
108. See cases cited note 110 infra.
109. Id.
110. Longoria-Castenada v. INS, 548 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1977); David v. INS, 548
F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1977).
111. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
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de facto deportation of the citizen child. This decision was contrary
to several appellate holdings,112 and was subsequently reversed by
the Third Circuit.'13 In a third case, a district court finding that the
deportation of a marijuana offender would impose cruel and unusual
punishment was summarily reversed without opinion by the Seventh
Circuit.1
14
A major constitutional issue recently in contention involved the
validity of a statutory provision which grants immigration benefits
to the mothers of illegitimate children but denies it to their fathers."'
In Fiallo v. Bell,"6 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
this statute, rejecting a contention that it denied equal protection to
American citizens. While the Court reaffirmed the ancient thesis of
sovereign federal power to define classes and prescribe benefits
under the immigration laws," 7 it left open a faint ray of hope for
possible intervention in an appropriate case. The Court emphasized
the "special judicial deference to congressional policy choices in the
immigration context" but acknowledged the possibility of "limited
judicial scrutiny" in assessing such legislation. However, as in the
earlier Kleindienst v. Mandel decision," 8 it rejected the need for
"more searching judicial scrutiny" because the rights of citizens and
resident aliens were implicated.
It is significant that in different contexts the Supreme Court has
repudiated like discriminations against illegitimate children and
their fathers"19-for example, Trimble v. Gordon,'2 a decision ren-
dered the same day as Fiallo. Since the Court declined to intervene
when confronted by like discriminations against American citizens
in the immigration laws, one may well wonder when the Supreme
Court would be moved to undertake the "limited judicial scrutiny"
suggested in Fiallo. A plausible explanation is that the Court intend-
112. Gonzalez-Cuevas v. INS, 515 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1975); Cervantes v. INS,
510 F.2d 89 (10th Cir. 1975); Robles v. INS, 485 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1973); Silver-
man v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1970).
113. Acosta v. Gaffney, 413 P. Supp. 827 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d
Cir. 1977).
114. Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd, 529 F.2d 530 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976).
115. I. & N. Act § 101(b)(1)-(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)-(2) (1970).
116. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
117. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 20, at 4-12.
118. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
119. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights
Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
120. 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977).
ed to indicate that such scrutiny could be invoked only in extreme
cases involving racial, religious, and comparable discriminations.
Finally, mention should be made of De Canas v. Bica,121 which
upheld a California statute penalizing those who knowingly employ
illegal aliens. To me this is a surprising decision because it deviated
from the Court's prior holdings 22 and from sound constitutional
doctrine. The control of illegal aliens in my view is a matter of
exclusive federal concern. The expected consequence of this decision
was to encourage various states to enact their own laws, for Congress
apparently is not eager to move ahead on proposed federal legisla-
tion. 2 3 A number of states have passed such laws, and additional
proposals are pending in other states. There are even proposals for
municipal legislation. 24
ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR RESIDENT ALIENS
Since Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 125 the Supreme Court has generally
supported the due process rights of resident aliens to be protected
against arbitrary curtailment of economic benefits.126 But early deci-
sions of the Supreme Court tolerated some limitations of such bene-
fits. 12 However, state discrimination limiting the economic benefits
of resident aliens has largely been eliminated since the Supreme
Court's decision in Graham v. Richardson, 1 8 followed shortly there-
after by its decisions in Sugarman v. Dougall,129 In re Griffiths, 130
and Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero. 131 Yet, there
have been some setbacks; one major source of discrimination remains
in the continued exclusion of aliens from the federal civil service,
which was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1976. 132 Also upheld by
121. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
122. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941).
123. The federal proposal has been known as the Rodino Bill, the last version
of which (H.R. 8713, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)) was passed by the House of
Representatives but not acted on in the Senate. In the current Congress, this
legislation (H.R. 1663, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)) was introduced by Represen-
tative Eilberg but no action on it has yet been taken.
124. See Roberts, Immigration and Naturalization in Congress, 54 INTERPRE-
TER RELEASES 98, 102 (1977).
125. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
126. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
127. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 20, at 1-118.
128. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
129. 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (statute requiring citizenship for state or municipal
employment held unconstitutional).
130. 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (state court rule precluding resident alien's admission
to the bar prohibited).
131. 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (statute precluding alien civil engineers from practic-
ing held unconstitutional).
132. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). See also Comment,
Federal Civil Service Employment: Resident Aliens Need Not Apply, 15 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 171 (1977).
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the Court was a federal refusal of medicare benefits to resident aliens
with less than five years residence in the United States. 33 However,
in its most recent decision the Supreme Court struck down state
legislation denying educational assistance to resident aliens who
were not interested in applying for naturalization. 34 Also pending
before the Court, but not yet argued, is another case involving the




The retention of American citizenship has been a fruitful source of
contention in the past. One area of debate has concerned the rights of
naturalized citizens, which were protected by the Supreme Court in
the famous Schneiderman v. United States"6 and Schneider v.
Rusk l3 1 decisions. Another major area of litigation concerned the
power of Congress to prescribe for the expatriation of American
citizens upon their performance of specified acts. 38 A continuing
debate in the Supreme Court, spanning many years,3 9 ultimately
produced a bare majority to strike down as unconstitutional a statu-
tory provision140 prescribing loss of citizenship for voting in a foreign
political election. This was the celebrated Afroyim v. Rusk case, 41 in
which Justice Black, writing for the majority, declared that an
American citizen could not be deprived of his citizenship "unless he
voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship."
Although disclaiming an intention to overrule Afroyim, the Su-
preme Court's subsequent ruling in Rogers v. Bellei I42 probably
undermined Justice Black's absolutist assertions in Afroyim. Bellei
upheld a statutory provision' 4 1 for loss of citizenship through failure
to establish residence in the United States by a child who had ac-
quired such citizenship at birth abroad through a single citizen par-
133. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
134. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 97 S. Ct. 2120 (1977).
135. Foley v. Connelie, 419 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), prob. juris noted, 97
S. Ct. 1577 (1977).
136. 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
137. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
138. See I. & N. Act § 349, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1970).
139. See Gordon, The Citizen and the State: Power of Congress to Expa-
triate American Citizens, 53 GEO. L.J. 315 (1965).
140. I. & N. Act § 349(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1970).
141. 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
142. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
143. I. & N. Act § 301(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1970).
ent.'" How much remains of the Afroyim doctrine is an issue that
eventually must be settled by the Supreme Court. 141
After the fierce controversies of the past, there has been little
recent activity on the citizenship front. Two items deserve brief
mention. One was a tax case, in which the estate of a deceased
woman unsuccessfully claimed that she had intended to relinquish
her American citizenship upon her marriage to an alien and to accept
his nationality. 146 The other case involved the alleged ineligibility to
citizenship-and consequential deportability-of an alien found to
have departed the United States and to have remained outside the
country in order to evade military service. The amnesty for Vietnam
era draft evaders proclaimed by President Carter 14 led to the remand
of the case by the Supreme Court, upon consent of the parties, for
administrative determination whether deportability was extin-
guished by the Presidential amnesty.148 This determination will af-
fect the status of many aliens now in the United States and in foreign
countries.
CONCLUSION
This survey has demonstrated the profound variety of issues con-
stantly presented to courts and administrators in immigration and
nationality cases. Unfortunately, the appellate courts are so overbur-
dened that they often resort to affirmance without opinion, an expe-
dient which is hardly satisfying to the parties or their attorneys.
Nevertheless, I commend the enterprising attorneys and public inter-
est organizations who continue to challenge administrative practices
and interpretations. Our brethren of the bar should not be dis-
couraged in confronting venerable prejudice and indifference. The
advocate's role in appealing to the conscience of the court is a neces-
sary aspect of our jurisprudence. His success in overcoming oppres-
sion and injustice is one of the richest rewards of our profession.
144. For subsequent amelioration of this statutory requirement, see Act of
Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-584, 86 Stat. 1289.
145. For a full discussion of this controversy and its present status, see Gor-
don, The Power of Congress to Terminate United States Citizenship-A Con-
tinuing Constitutional Debate, 4 CONN. L. R.v. 611 (1972).
146. United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
823 (1976).
147. Pres. Proc. No. 4483, 42 Fed. Reg. 4391 (1977).
148. Rahman v. INS, 97 S. Ct. 1091 (1977).
